Trump has been back in office for less than a hundred days, and while the charge he is leading is unmistakable, its destination remains uncertain. The two texts that follow are attempts to make sense of what is being set in motion, and what that reveals about the current configuration of political and economic power.
Both reject the idea that Trump marks a rupture in American priorities. Instead, they trace how long-standing tendencies in U.S. statecraft — toward authoritarianism, militarization, and social demolition — are being sharpened and accelerated. Chaos is deliberately being created for the purpose of reorganizing governance and geopolitical alignment around the shifting needs of capital.
The texts differ in how they understand the nature of the project, and disagree on the coherence, or lack thereof, of the Trump administration’s policies. The first sees the administration as a vehicle for multiple, often competing factions — held together by Trump’s personal authority but lacking a stable ideological core. The second views the administration’s actions as part of a coherent effort to prepare for inter-imperialist war.
The two texts offer views from different perspectives on the unfolding of events. Both were written and discussed before the Trump administration raised the stakes on April 2 by imposing hefty global tariffs. So a short third text is added that examines the impact of this event.
IP
April 5
What Next?: Expecting The Unexpected
Some Observations
The contribution Trump makes to the world is chaos. Perhaps not since Mao’s Cultural Revolution have we seen such an open desire to take a chainsaw to an enormous state apparatus, to root out opponents, to expunge unacceptable ideology (currently labelled ‘wokeness’) and to impose a political discipline on its apparatchiks. And beyond, his behaviour has thrown the American-led global economic order into major uncertainties. So, too, with military alliances – he posits foes as friends and friends as foes. He has the power to do this because of the major electoral successes of the Republican Party which has put him at the head of the American state which manages the strongest national economy and the most powerful military ever. Yet much of the global flow of events today – over which the United States plays a dominant role – is profoundly turbulent because of his behaviour.
Because of the vagaries of the American electoral system, and the ways in which the membership of its arms of government – Executive, Legislature and Judiciary – are chosen, there has often been disharmony between them. In the present circumstances however, the intensification of economic and geo-political contradictions are being driven – paradoxically –as a result of the thorough electoral victory of the Republican Party which enables Trump to rule as an absolutist. So far. Only for ten years since 1945 have the Republicans led a unified government (that is, the House, Senate and Presidency) and eight of those were in this century – led by Bush the Younger and Trump himself. And, furthermore, he has a conservative super-majority on the Supreme Court.
The first major reorganisation and strengthening of the Republican Party in recent years came with the growth of the Tea Party Movement – a set of autonomous groupings, funded in the background by oil and tobacco companies and wealthy industrialists such as the Koch Family. Several supporters in Congress formed the Tea Party Caucus supporting social and fiscal conservatism – tax cuts and a small state. It was this Republican Party that Trump was able to hijack for the 2016 election after purging it of major dynasties (such as the Bushes) and key individuals such as McCain, Ryan and, latterly, Romney. And during the 2024 election he cleared out the last vestiges of old Republicanism in the Party – the Cheneys. His purge was complete.
What is the Republican Party today? All political parties are made up of factions – some ideological, some with particular economic or military perspectives, some with orientations for control of their nation’s population. Factions can be formal organisations or loose movements, and change over time according to circumstances. Few political parties across the world have not undergone substantial change since, say, the Second World War. Different commentators have sliced and diced the Republican Party in various ways – and with various overlaps; for example, some describe the Five Families in Congress and others the Six Kinds of Republican Voters in the electorate. Without going into detail, we can point to some prominent features of the Party today: the power of the Christian Right, the re-growth of isolationism, support for tax-cutting policies (for the rich), affinity for transaction relations rather than alliances in foreign policy, preoccupation with race and immigration. Some of these are long-standing, others more recent. What brought these together for the Republican Party was Trump’s electoral success. Coherence was not a requirement.
After the 2020 election and the January 6 riots, many of Trump’s erstwhile supporters distanced themselves from him. Even the right-wing media that had long supported him, such as Murdoch’s Fox News, cooled. The numerous indictments against him tied him into many legal tangles with state bodies and individuals. However, his electoral prospects strengthened as his legal woes grew, reinforced over the last two years of Biden’s presidency as the incumbent’s popularity diminished. Again, this did not take place in a vacuum. The analysts who monitor the right wing media and social media saw the resonance he was getting in the electorate and as election day approached so, too, big institutions moved towards him, or at least did not behave in ways that would attract his well-known reputation for retribution. Major unions shied from endorsing the Harris/Walz ticket as did major newspapers such as the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. Oil majors began to contribute substantial funds to Trump, joined in this by crypto companies, Silicon Valley (historically unsupportive), real estate companies, and others seeking to weaken regulation or pursue funding. So, too, did many billionaires including Vivek Ramaswamy and Elon Musk.
These circumstances have led to a whole political architecture (much of it new) in the Republican Party with Trump as its keystone because of his electoral support. This dependence on Trump personally renders the structure inherently unstable. He is not driven by any political ideology; the ideology and policy in the party is provided by others; Trump provides the chaos. (Nixon once asked his advisors if he should project a madman persona to the North Vietnamese to unnerve them; his advisors dissuaded him as it would reduce confidence – both among allies and foes – in whatever he said. Trump seems not to have received such advice.) His practice among associates is to let them fight it out in front of him, leaving him to pick and choose. If he doesn’t have an ideology himself, Trump nonetheless has contributors to fill the void: one of these is the America First Policy Institute; another is Project 2025, authored by the Heritage Foundation (again, financed in part by the Koch family). So, he is not driven in same way as Putin, Xi, Lukashenko or Erdogan who, as authoritarians, impose directions on their states.
Trump’s policies are generated through his personnel choices. The point man for attacking the American state apparatus is the chainsaw-wielding Musk – who knows about slashing manpower from his takeover of Twitter – whose main interest (along with getting as much NASA funding for his SpaceX company projects) is in getting great swathes of data for his AI business; in this he is helped by Scott Bessent, the Secretary of the Treasury, who gave his Musk-rats access to the enormous data bases his Department has built. Bessent – another one indifferent to allies – made fortunes betting against the UK Pound on Black Wednesday, 1992, and the Japanese Yen in 2013. Ruthlessness is paramount.
Additionally, the Trump administration does have targets. First, in regard to the American state apparatus, what Musk and Trump call government efficiency is slashing federal manpower and associated costs, cutting the social wage with likely targets including Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare. At the same time, Trump wants retribution on various federal agencies and individual judges and lawyers for what they put him through in the Biden years.
Second, in regard to foreign alliances, Trump clearly is aiming at the European members of NATO. Ever since its formation in 1949, all American presidents have complained about the insufficiency of financial contributions made by European governments to the military alliance. And in 2011, Robert Gates, the then-Secretary of Defence, warned European governments that “If current trends in the decline of European defence capabilities are not halted and reversed, future US political leaders …. may not consider the return on America’s investment in Nato worth the cost,” It’s been a long time coming but Trump’s actions and threats – especially regarding Ukraine – have finally woken up the European governments. The financial aspect also plays into Trump’s views on alliances: he especially does not want to be fettered by NATO’s Article 5 – an attack on one being seen as an attack on all – ignoring the fact that the only time this has been invoked was to America’s benefit after the 9/11 attacks. So the Europeans have to face up to a possibility that they thought could never happen to them: being thrown into the dustbin of erstwhile allies of the American state that litter its imperialist history – such as the leaders of various regimes in South Vietnam, Iran, Egypt, Kurdistan or Afghanistan who at different times outlived their usefulness.
Third, the attempt to discard the USAID appropriations shows a desire to abandon costly soft power programmes, and to use the bluntest economic and military measures on allies and adversaries; this contrasts with the substantial investments of others – especially China, Russia and Saudi Arabia – in their own substantial global influencing programmes.
The few weeks since the inauguration are not enough to get a sense of how this is all going to play out; apart from the actions of the Trump we need to see the reactions of those affected and we have yet to see the scale of resistance to the Trump Administration’s actions. First, in the state apparatus itself which, by its very nature, is highly conservative and resistant to change. Top echelons of the military have already ‘had their haircuts’ and this will inevitably generate a resistance, albeit (perhaps) under the radar. Second, foreign allies and adversaries are watching closely the actions of the American state and gauging how to react. Third, the threats over tariffs and trade embargoes get imposed, rescinded , reapplied as if by whimsy. This is creating havoc with production planning as well as the administration of the charges, especially concerning the multi-border crossings of components in international production processes. And the resulting nervousness shows in the stock and financial markets.
The policies of the Trump Administration will also affect the American population at large in profound ways. In the first instance, the tariff programme – if pursued – will lead to further inflation, which contributed to the downfall of the 2024 Democratic presidential ticket. And the Republican aim to reduce taxes will, as ever, lower the social wage.
But the main question is: will the working class stand for this?
Marlowe
12 March
TRUMP 2 : A GOVERNMENT FOR WAR PREPARATION
Trump’s policy is a drastic change in direction of US foreign policy. Instead of promoting cooperation with allies and using “soft power ‘such as development aid, instead of propaganda to spread an image of democracy and human rights worldwide, the U.S. government is now openly proclaiming the ’Might makes right” principle: “We are the top predator. What are you gone do about it?”
This is a spectacular departure from the style of its predecessors. But the priority of American foreign policy has not changed: maintaining American hegemony, preventing rivals from threatening that position. This implies:
1. maintaining the dominant position of the dollar and thus control over the global financial system;
2. maintaining and increasing military supremacy;
3. Seizing more raw materials and markets.
How does Trump translate this in the current context? He is sowing chaos and fear. Chaos, everyone knows by now, is bad for the economy, it discourages productive investment. But on the other hand it also makes investments possible. Especially in the arms industry. America is by far the world’s largest arms dealer. Europe’s armament efforts are going to yield hundreds of billions of dollars for the American military industry. Fear also has its uses. By scaring the European public that America might abandon them in a war with Russia, Trump gave the European governments the needed argument to shift state spending from social purposes to “Defense.” That was the purpose of this theater. The European Commission is playing its part: this week it advised all citizens to stockpile emergency supplies because of the growing danger of war. But in a way, the alliance between the U.S. and Europe is actually getting stronger. A Europe armed to the teeth is given the task of containing Russia so America can focus on China. America would not insist on European arming if it did not see Europe as a loyal ally. There will be no war over Greenland. Trump exerts the same pressure on America’s Asian allies. For example, he wants Taiwan to increase its military spending to 10 percent of its GDP! The cash register is ringing.
Meanwhile, the U.S. demonstrated its military supremacy by drastically degrading the military potential of the Russian army in Ukraine without deploying troops of its own. The same in the Middle East. It has been made clear that no country there is a match for to the Israeli army which is a de facto affiliate of the Pentagon. A strong military grip on the oil-rich region is seen as essential by the US. Energy supply would be decisive in a global war.
Chaos has other advantages. In turbulent times, capital seeks a safe haven. Because America is the strongest bastion of capitalism, chaos increases the relative attractiveness of dollar assets. Thus, a flow of money from all over the world continues to make American capital richer. The planned tax cuts and the elimination of environmental regulations add to that attractiveness.
Trump’s import tariffs, and the wild way he imposes, repeals and re-imposes them, add to the chaos. And everyone knows by now that they are inflationary. But that depends. If exporters continue to charge the same prices and tariffs are added to them, then of course final prices rise. Then tariffs function as a consumption tax that everyone pays, but also creating room for lowering the income taxes of the rich. But the Trump administration is also counting that many companies exporting to America will lower their prices to remain competitive in the U.S. market. In that case, the tariffs are not inflationary because the exporters are paying them at the expense of their profits (or of wage costs, if they can lower them). In either case, U.S. capital wins.
The US can do this because other countries’ dependence on the US market is much greater than the other way around. So those others are more vulnerable. They do threaten countermeasures but those are limited, almost symbolic so far. They know they cannot win a trade war. So the U.S. can pass on the threatening devalorization of capital to other countries.
Some call that “the politics of despair” but the despair of others is greater. In Europe, the future of crucial sectors like the auto industry looks bleak. Must they close more factories in Europe and open in the U.S. to survive? Or are they hoping that a switch to military production will offer them a way out? In China, capital’s devalorization manifests itself in deflation: the real estate sector crisis destroyed the savings of millions, prices are falling, profits are falling, tax revenues are falling, the budget deficit has nearly tripled since 2018, the industry is desperately seeking outlets that will make its economies of scale profitable. The only bright spot for Chinese capital is the rise in exports, to America in particular. That earned China a $992 billion trade surplus last year. So in a trade war, it has the most to lose.
For less powerful countries of the “global south” such as Mexico, U.S. tariff increases are potentially disastrous. The Trump administration’s decision to largely eliminate development assistance (Musk boasted that he finished that job in a weekend) will further increase the chaos in the South. That more people will die of starvation and disease as a result is of no concern to Trump and the class he represents. In any case, those are “superfluous people” who can’t yield a profit. Like Gazans or HIV patients or war refugees. That precisely the richest man in the world was given the task of eliminating them illustrates the obscenity of this administration.
Trump also holds the strongest cards against Europe and other allies. His latest tariff – a 25% tax on imported cars – is clearly protectionist in intent, as are the tariffs on steel and aluminum. The administration also hopes the tariffs will encourage foreign manufacturers to open factories in the US. Because America’s industrial base has been seriously eroded. That may be the US’s Achilles heel in a war with China. War is a voracious consumer. America’s industrial power won the previous world wars but today China’s industrial capacity is greater than the U.S.’s.
China is the main target of Trump’s tariffs. It is the only country whose total exports are targeted. The goal is to limit trade with China, to reduce dependence on cheaper Chinese industrial products, to redirect international trade patterns according to war preparation needs. Neither for U.S. capital nor for U.S. consumers is it a good thing to replace cheap Chinese products with more expensive ones. So it is quite possible that inflation and the decline in stock market values will force Trump to make a course correction. If the government persists with its tariff war despite the negative economic consequences, then we will know how urgent war preparations are for it.
Trump is also sowing chaos and fear domestically. As with tariffs, layoffs in the federal public sector are being imposed, then withdrawn, or perhaps withdrawn, or stopped by courts, or implemented anyway… Meanwhile, well over a hundred thousand in the federal public sector, no one seems to know exactly how many, have already lost their jobs and income. The hasty and rash manner in which this avalanche of layoffs rolls down shows how urgent it is for the government to make cuts in its budget, to make way for military spending and tax cuts.
The arbitrary and extreme measures against undocumented immigrants also serve to create a climate of fear. You never know where and when the immigration police ICE will strike, you don’t know where they will take you, perhaps to a prison in Guantanamo or worse, El Salvador. It turns the millions of undocumented into docile workers.
So far, these attacks on the working class have provoked little resistance. Where are the strikes, the mass demonstrations? The right-wing propaganda machine has succeeded in cultivating a lot of antipathy toward federal government personnel (“the deep state”) and undocumented workers (“rapists, criminals, terrorists…”) which undermines working class solidarity. Unions in the auto industry (UAW) and other sectors applaud Trump’s protectionism. The lack of solidarity of working people is what creates room for his brutal politics, what allows him to define friend and foe.
But not only in the US is the flame of solidarity burning low. In the rest of the world, too, those in power seem to have their hands free to organize impoverishment and build up their armies. In Europe, too, we are inundated with war propaganda. We are being pumped in that we must be “prepared” for the coming disaster. As the European Commission stated in its new guidelines: “Preparedness requires a complete change in the way citizens think.” “We need a war mentality”, said Nato secretary general Rutte. The managers of Capital want to change how we think, so we will kill each other for their sake.
It remains to be seen, however, how effective that propaganda will remain when a global recession hits and the attack on working people’s living standards necessarily becomes much broader. Perhaps that shock will shake us awake, perhaps the very need will raise the consciousness that our collective self-preservation requires a refusal to obey, a break with Capital and its political representants in all nations, Russia, America, China and Europe included.
Sanderr
March 30
“LIBERATION DAY”?
The above text was written before Trump fired his massive salvo (his words) in the developing trade war on April 2. The scope of these measures far exceeded most expectations. The increase of tariffs on Chinese imports (now 54 % on all and 79 % on some products) is not that surprising but few foresaw that he would raise tariffs on the entire world (uninhabited islands included) and some very high ones on America’s closest allies.
The stated objective is to force foreign capital to invest in the US to remain competitive on the American market, thereby boosting the US’s industrial base, and to harvest a vast sum for the US treasury (a trillion dollar per year, they hope) that could be used for military spending and tax cuts for the rich. But the sharp decline of the American stock markets (6 trillion dollar “evaporated” in the first two days) shows that the measures resulted in de-investment instead. Clearly, the owners of capital do not share Trump’s confidence that they will launch “a new era of growth and prosperity”.
Stock markets in most other countries plunged as well. Everywhere, capitalists are bracing for rising inflation and a contraction of the world economy. Other countries feel forced to retaliate (China already has) and Trump has threatened to retaliate against their retaliations, which would accelerate the global downturn further. There would be no winners, only different degrees of loss.
But the downturn was coming anyway, even without a trade war. The trade war will make it worse but it’s not all bad news for the US: much of the capital that is fleeing the stock markets is seeking the safety of American treasury notes, allowing the government to issue debt at low rates. Don’t expect the budget deficit to fall.
The downturn will hit the working class hard. Inflation will cut real wages, bankruptcies will increase unemployment, especially in the weaker sectors and countries. The budget cuts of the social wage (health care, welfare, etc) will spread poverty. Capitalism increasingly withdraws from responsibility for the social reproduction of humankind. Trump’s brutal style combined with his populism is an increasingly popular recipe for confronting the resulting class struggle.
The downturn will hurt many capitalists as well but it is a necessity from the point of view of the capitalist system. It will destroy excess capital in all its forms (debt, financial bubbles, productive capacity, people) and thereby make more room for the rest. But not enough. That’s why the course towards war will continue.
It is possible that the markets will force Trump to backtrack. It is also quite possible that his growing unpopularity will lead to a victory of the Democrats in the Congress elections of 2026 which would limit his power. It is possible that he will leave office as one of the most despised leaders ever. But in the meantime he will have done his dirty duty for his system, which is not only a system of production but, especially in times like these, a system of destruction as well.
Sanderr
April 3